It had already become apparent that the plans of the First American Army centered on the eradication of the St. Mihiel salient which, since 1914, had penetrated menacingly into French territory, dangerously close to important avenues of communication if the Allies were to advance at other points along the line. And it was no less apparent that the general front occupied by the 90th Division would be the scene of important engagements during this action, and that the particular sector before the 360th Infantry was pregnant with danger. For in the Bois le Pretre there was, at this time, more barbed wire entanglements than existed, perhaps, on any other sector of the western front, and among the stone quarries to the right front the ramifications of the underground defenses had been limited only when they were pronounced impervious to assault by high German commanders. Until the actual issuance of the attack order this was the complex problem which seemingly confronted the regiment.

The attack was launched at 9:30 o'clock, and throughout the day the battle was waged. Keyed to a pitch of zeal which refused to recognize fatigue or the destructiveness at concentrated machine gun fire and high explosives bursting among them the battalions fought from a strong point to strong point until at 4 o'clock that afternoon a position on a line from Camp de la Scource on the left to Hill 319.2, north of Norroy, on the right, had been occupied. Camp de Norroy was entirely in the possession of the regiment and the town of Norroy itself had been swept clear of the Germans . . . The Boise le Pretre had been cleared, although at a considerable loss of life and many lesser casualties.〔